Abstract. We will discuss the RowHammer problem in DRAM, which is a prime (and likely the first) example of how a circuit-level failure mechanism in Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can cause a practical and widespread system security vulnerability. RowHammer is the phenomenon that repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM chip predictably causes errors in physically-adjacent rows. It is caused by a hardware failure mechanism called read disturb errors. Building on our initial fundamental work that appeared at ISCA 2014, Google Project Zero demonstrated that this hardware phenomenon can be exploited by user-level programs to gain kernel privileges. Many other recent works demonstrated other attacks exploiting RowHammer, including remote takeover of a server vulnerable to RowHammer. We will analyze the root causes of the problem and examine solution directions. We will also discuss what other problems may be lurking in DRAM and other types of memories, e.g., NAND flash and Phase Change Memory, which can potentially threaten the foundations of reliable and secure systems, as the memory technologies scale to higher densities.
Summary
As memory scales down to smaller technology nodes, new failure mechanisms emerge that threaten its correct operation [79, 80] . If such failures are not anticipated and corrected, they can not only degrade system reliability and availability but also, even more importantly, open up new security vulnerabilities: a malicious attacker can exploit the exposed failure mechanism to take over an entire system. As such, new failure mechanisms in memory can become practical and significant threats to system security.
In this keynote talk, based on our ISCA 2014 paper [55] , we introduce the RowHammer problem in DRAM, which is a prime (and likely the first) example of a real circuit-level failure mechanism that causes a practical and widespread system security vulnerability. RowHammer, as it is now popularly referred to, is the phenomenon that repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM chip causes bit flips in physically-adjacent rows at consistently predictable bit locations. It is caused by a hardware failure mechanism called DRAM disturbance errors, which is a manifestation of circuit-level cell-to-cell interference in a scaled memory technology. Specifically, when a DRAM row is opened (i.e., activated) and closed (i.e., precharged) repeatedly (i.e., hammered), enough times within a DRAM refresh interval, one or more bits in physically-adjacent DRAM rows can be flipped to the wrong value. Using an FPGA-based DRAM testing infrastructure [70, 42] , we tested 129 DRAM modules manufactured by three major manufacturers in seven recent years (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) and found that 110 of them exhibited RowHammer errors, the earliest of which dates back to 2010. Our ISCA 2014 paper [55] provides a detailed and rigorous analysis of various characteristics of RowHammer, including its data pattern dependence, repeatability of errors, relationship with leaky cells, and various circuit-level causes of the phenomenon.
We demonstrate that a very simple user-level program [55, 3] can reliably and consistently induce RowHammer errors in commodity AMD and Intel systems using vulnerable DRAM modules. We released the source code of this program [3] , which Google Project Zero later enhanced [4]. Using our user-level RowHammer program, we showed that both read and write accesses to memory can induce bit flips, all of which occur in rows other than the one that is being accessed. Since different DRAM rows are mapped to different software pages, our user-level program could reliably corrupt specific bits in pages belonging to other programs. As a result, RowHammer errors can be exploited by a malicious program to breach memory protection and compromise the system. In fact, we hypothesized, in our ISCA 2014 paper, that our user-level program, with some engineering effort, could be developed into a disturbance attack that injects errors into other programs, crashes the system, or hijacks control of the system.
RowHammer exposes a security threat since it leads to a serious breach of memory isolation: an access to one memory row (e.g., an OS page) predictably modifies the data stored in another row (e.g., another OS page). Malicious software, which we call disturbance attacks [55] , or RowHammer attacks, can be written to take advantage of these disturbance errors to take over an entire system. Inspired by our ISCA 2014 paper's fundamental findings, researchers from Google Project Zero demonstrated in 2015 that RowHammer can be effectively exploited by user-level programs to gain kernel privileges on real systems [94, 95] . Tens of other works since then demonstrated other attacks exploiting RowHammer. These include remote takeover of a server vulnerable to RowHammer via JavaScript code execution [40] , takeover of a victim virtual machine by another virtual machine running on the same system [92] , takeover of a mobile device by a malicious user-level application that requires no permissions [103] , takeover of a mobile system by triggering RowHammer using the WebGL interface on a mobile GPU [35] , takeover of a remote system by triggering RowHammer through the Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) protocol [101, 67] , and various other attacks (e.g., [108, 14, 39, 87, 13, 45, 86, 8, 102, 85] ). Thus, RowHammer has widespread and profound real implications on system security, as it destroys memory isolation on top of which modern system security principles are built.
We provide a wide variety of solutions, both immediate and longer-term, to RowHammer, starting from our ISCA 2014 paper [55] . A popular immediate solution we describe and analyze, is to increase the refresh rate of memory such that the probability of inducing a RowHammer error before DRAM cells get re-freshed is reduced. Several major system manufacturers have adopted this solution and released security patches that increased DRAM refresh rates (e.g., [11, 43, 66, 34] ) in memory controllers deployed in the field. While this solution is practical and effective in reducing the vulnerability, assuming the refresh rate is increased enough to avoid the vulnerability, it has the significant drawbacks of increasing energy/power consumption, reducing system performance, and degrading quality of service experienced by user programs. Our paper shows that the refresh rate needs to be increased by 7X if we want to eliminate every single RowHammer-induced error we saw in our tests of 129 DRAM modules. Since DRAM refresh is already a significant burden [69, 70, 31, 46, 47, 89, 49, 84, 33] on energy, performance, and QoS, increasing it by any significant amount would only exacerbate the problem. Yet, increased refresh rate is likely the most practical immediate solution to RowHammer that can protect vulnerable chips that are already deployed in the field.
After describing and analyzing six solutions to RowHammer, our ISCA 2014 paper shows that the long-term solution to RowHammer can actually be simple and low cost. We introduce a new idea, called PARA (Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation): when the memory controller closes a row (after it was activated), with a very low probability, it refreshes the adjacent rows. The probability value is a parameter determined by the system designer or provided programmatically, if needed, to trade off between performance overhead and vulnerability protection guarantees. We show that this solution is very effective: it eliminates the RowHammer vulnerability, providing much higher reliability guarantees than modern hard disks provide today, while requiring no storage cost and having negligible performance and energy overheads [55] . Variants of this solution are currently being adopted in DRAM chips and memory controllers [5, 6] .
The RowHammer problem leads to a new mindset that has enabled a renewed interest in hardware security research: real memory chips are vulnerable, in a simple and widespread manner, and this causes real security problems. We believe the RowHammer problem will worsen over time since DRAM cells are getting closer to each other with technology scaling. Other similar vulnerabilities may also be lurking in DRAM and other types of memories, e.g., NAND flash memory or Phase Change Memory, that can potentially threaten the foundations of secure systems [80] . Our work advocates a principled system-memory co-design approach to memory reliability and security research that can enable us to better anticipate and prevent such vulnerabilities.
Significance, Impact and the Future
RowHammer has spurred significant amount of research and industry attention since its publication in 2014. Our ISCA 2014 paper [55] is the first to experimentally and scientifically demonstrate the RowHammer vulnerability, its characteristics, and its prevalence in real DRAM chips. RowHammer is a prime (and likely the first) example of a hardware failure mechanism that causes a practical and widespread system security vulnerability. Thus, the implications of RowHammer and our ISCA 2014 paper on systems security is tremendous, both in the short term and the long term: it is the first work we know of that shows that a real reliability problem in one of the ubiquitous general-purpose hardware components (DRAM chips) can cause practical and widespread system security vulnerabilities.
Since its publication in 2014, RowHammer has already had significant realworld impact on both industry and academia in at least four directions. These directions will continue to exert long-term impact for RowHammer, as memory cells continue to get closer to each other while the technology scaling of memory continues.
First, our work has inspired many researchers to exploit RowHammer to devise new attacks. As mentioned earlier, tens of papers were written in top security venues that demonstrate various practical attacks exploiting RowHammer (e.g., [108, 14, 39, 87, 13, 45, 8, 85, 40, 92, 103, 35] ). These attacks started with Google Project Zero's first work in 2015 [94, 95] and they continue to this date, with the latest ones that we know of being published in Summer 2018 [86, 67, 101, 102] . We believe there is a lot more to come in this direction: as systems security researchers understand more about RowHammer, and as the RowHammer phenomenon continues to fundamentally affect memory chips due to technology scaling problems [80] , researchers and practitioners will develop different types of attacks to exploit RowHammer in various contexts and in many more creative ways. Some recent reports suggest that new-generation DDR4 DRAM chips are vulnerable to RowHammer [58, 85, 8, 10] , so the fundamental security research on RowHammer is likely to continue into the future.
Second, due to its prevalence in real DRAM chips, as demonstrated in our ISCA 2014 paper, RowHammer has become a popular phenomenon [105, 1, 2, 41, 58, 95, 83, 9, 37], which, in turn, has helped make hardware security even more "mainstream" in popular media and the broader security community. It showed that hardware reliability problems can be very serious security threats that have to be defended against. A well-read article from the Wired magazine, all about RowHammer, is entitled "Forget Software -Now Hackers are Exploiting Physics!" [38] , indicating the shift of mindset towards very low-level hardware security vulnerabilities in the popular mainstream security community. Many other popular articles in press have been written about RowHammer, many of which pointing to the our ISCA 2014 work [55] as the first demonstration and scientific analysis of the RowHammer problem. Showing that hardware reliability problems can be serious security threats and pulling them to the popular discussion space, and thus influencing the mainstream discourse, creates a very long term impact for the RowHammer problem.
Third, our work inspired many solution and mitigation techniques for RowHammer from both researchers and industry practitioners. Apple publicly mentioned, in their critical security release for RowHammer, that they increased the memory refresh rates due to the "original research by Yoongu Kim et al. (2014)" [11] . Memtest86 program was updated, including a RowHammer test, acknowledging our ISCA 2014 paper [83] . Many academic works developed solutions to RowHammer, working from our original research (e.g., [12, 50, 39, 96, 15, 44, 97, 36, 104, 65] ). Multiple industrial solutions (e.g., [5, 6] ) were inspired by our new solution to RowHammer, Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation (PARA). We believe such solutions will continue to be generated in both academia and industry, extending RowHammer's impact into the very long term.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, RowHammer enabled a shift of mindset among mainstream security researchers: general-purpose hardware is fallible (in a very widespread manner) and its problems are actually exploitable. This shift of mindset enabled many systems security researchers to examine hardware in more depth and understand its inner workings and vulnerabilities better. We believe it is no coincidence that two of the groups that concurrently discovered the Meltdown [68] and Spectre [56] vulnerabilities (Google Project Zero and TU Graz InfoSec) have heavily worked on RowHammer attacks before. We believe this shift in mindset, enabled in good part by the existence and prevalence of RowHammer, will continue to be very be important for discovering and solving other potential vulnerabilities that may appear as a result of both technology scaling and hardware design.
Other Potential Vulnerabilities
We believe that, as memory technologies scale to higher densities, other problems may start appearing (or may already be going unnoticed) that can potentially threaten the foundations of secure systems. There have been recent large-scale field studies a well as small-scale controlled studies of real memory errors on real devices and systems, showing that both DRAM and NAND flash memory technologies are becoming less reliable [82, 78, 98-100, 77, 93, 28, 27, 74, 73, 17, 25, 79, 84, 80] . As detailed experimental analyses of real DRAM and NAND flash chips show, both technologies are becoming much more vulnerable to cell-to-cell interference effects [82, 55, 26, 22, 20, 17, 21, 81, 72, 23, 28, 27, 79, 80] , data retention is becoming significantly more difficult in both technologies [69, 47, 70, 49, 89, 31, 46, 75, 25, 18, 71, 17, 21, 19, 81, 48, 28, 27, 74, 73, 82, 79] , and error variation within and across chips is increasingly prominent [70, 63, 30, 29, 17, 21, 64, [51] [52] [53] . Emerging memory technologies [79, 76] , such as Phase-Change Memory [59, 111, 88, 90, 106, 91, 61, 60, 110, 109] , STT-MRAM [32, 57] , and RRAM/ReRAM/ memristors [107] are likely to exhibit similar and perhaps even more exacerbated reliability issues. We believe, if not carefully accounted for and corrected, these reliability problems may surface as security problems as well, as in the case of RowHammer, especially if the technology is employed as part of the main memory system that is directly exposed to user-level programs. We believe future work examining these vulnerabilities, among others, is promising for both fixing the vulnerabilities and enabling the effective scaling of memory technology.
Acknowledgments
This short paper and the associated keynote talk are heavily based on two previous papers we have written on RowHammer, one that first scientifically introduced and analyzed the phenomenon in ISCA 2014 [55] and the other that provides an analysis and future outlook on RowHammer [80] . They are a result of the research done together with many students and collaborators over the course of the past 7-8 years. In particular, three PhD theses have shaped the understanding that led to this work. These are Yoongu Kim's thesis entitled "Architectural Techniques to Enhance DRAM Scaling" [54] , Yu Cai's thesis entitled "NAND Flash Memory: Characterization, Analysis, Modeling and Mechanisms" [24] and his continued follow-on work after his thesis, summarized in [28, 27] , and Donghyuk Lee's thesis entitled "Reducing DRAM Latency at Low Cost by Exploiting Heterogeneity" [62] . We also acknowledge various funding agencies (NSF, SRC, ISTC, CyLab) and industrial partners (AliBaba, AMD, Google, Facebook, HP Labs, Huawei, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Nvidia, Oracle, Qualcomm, Rambus, Samsung, Seagate, VMware) who have supported the presented and other related work in my group generously over the years. The first version of this talk was delivered at a CMU CyLab Partners Conference in September 2015. Another version of the talk was delivered as part of an Invited Session at DAC 2016, with a collaborative accompanying paper entitled "Who Is the Major Threat to Tomorrows Security? You, the Hardware Designer" [16] . The most recent version is the invited talk given at the Top Picks in Hardware and Embedded Security workshop, co-located with ICCAD 2018 [7] , where RowHammer was selected as a Top Pick among hardware and embedded security papers published between 2012-2017. I would like to also thank Christina Giannoula for her help in preparing this manuscript. 
